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NOTES
DISCOVERY OF THE STATE'S WITNESSES:

State v. Walters

Defendant, a New Orleans Police Department patrolman dressed
in civilian clothes, was assigned to the "lost children" detail along
the Canal Street portion of the Krewe of Bacchus Mardi Gras parade
route. He fired one shot from his revolver and injured two people
in a marching band. Defendant was indicted and charged with two
counts of negligent injury. The trial judge granted defendant's motion
seeking to discover the names and addresses of the state's witnesses.
Noting that defense counsel would be unable to find the names and
addresses of witnesses through "normal investigative means," the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the trial judge had the discretion to
order the disclosure of the state's actual and potential witnesses and
that this discretion had not been abused. State v. Walters, 408 So.
2d 1337 (La. 1982).
Defendant's pretrial discovery of the names and addresses of prosecution witnesses is a subject of considerable debate. Although model
discovery provisions favor such disclosure' and several states have
enacted statutes that provide the defense with a list of the state's
witnesses,' neither the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procredure3 nor the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 4 expressly provide for this
disclosure. Protection of witnesses from physical harm or threats, and
protection of witnesses from pressure to change their testimony, have
been primary reasons for nondisclosure.' Proponents of disclosure emCopyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
2 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE S 11-2.1(a)(1) (1980);
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE S 421(a) (1974).
1.

UNIF. RULES OF

2. For discovery statutes authorizing such disclosure, see FLA.R. CRiM. P. 3.220(a(lXi)
(West 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, S 114-9 (Smith-Hurd 1971). Some statutes require the
state to list its witnesses on the indictment or bill of information. ARK. STAT. ANN. S 43-1004
(1947); IDAHO CODE S 19-1404 (1948); IND. CODE ANN. S 35-3.1-1-2(6)(c) (Burns 1979).
3. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 716-729.6.
4. A proposed revision to FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, which would have required the
government, upon request, to furnish the defense with a written list of those witnesses
it planned to call at trial was rejected by Congress. H.R. 6799, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
S 3 (1975); see Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendment Act of 1975, 89 Stat.
370 (1975). See also 18 U.S.C. S 3432 (1976), which requires a prosecutor in a capital
case to provide the defense with a list of the prosecution witnesses at least three
days before trial.
5. See Discovery in Criminal Cases, 44 F.R.D. 481, 499-500 (1967); Ratnoff, The
New Criminal Deposition Statute in Ohio-Help or Hindrance to Justice? 19 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 279, 284 (1968); see also H. CONF. REP. No. 94-414, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
9, 12, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 713, 716 (indicates that such
concerns were responsible for the rejection of the 1975 proposed revisions to FED.
R. CRIM. P. 16, discussed in note 4, supra).
The threat of market retaliation against a witness in a criminal antitrust case
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phasize that trial is a truth-seeking process and that protective orders'
and motions to allow the perpetuation of testimony for use at trial
dissipate the concerns of opponents. The latter option (motions to allow
the perpetuation of testimony) gives the defense needed materials
while minimizing the incentive to improperly force a state witness's
absence or change in testimony.'
The disclosure of the identity of prosecution witnesses prior to
trial is a significant departure from past Louisiana jurisprudence. Both
before and after the enactment of the Louisiana discovery articles,8
courts have been consistent in holding that the defense is not entitled
to a list of the government's witnesses.' Motions to produce such lists,
in the absence of statutory or jurisprudential authority for disclosure,
generally have been dismissed.'0
In the instant case, the court based its holding upon statutory
and constitutional grounds, emphasizing its deference to the trial court
in pretrial matters. The court analyzed the Louisiana discovery articles
and found no statutory prohibition of the disclosure of names and addresses of the state's witnesses. In addition, the court found that forcing the defendant to prepare for trial without the requested list of
witnesses violated fundamental fairness. Disclosure was therefore constitutionally mandated under the special circumstances of the case.

is another illustration of the adverse effect of disclosure. See Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke
Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962); House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern
Co., 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1962).
6. Ratnoff, supra note 5, at 286; LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 729.1(B); FED. R. CRIM.
P. 16(d)(1).
7. J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE RULES PAMPHLET pt. 3, S 16-3 at 217 (1982). See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 15. In Louisiana, the protective order is limited to demanding an
appearance bond, LA. R.S. 15:257; in default of such, a deposition may be taken at
the witness's request, LA. R.S. 15:258 & 15:259.
8. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 716-729.6 (enacted 1977).
9. State v. Hennigan, 404 So. 2d 222 (La. 1981); State v. Jackson, 362 So. 2d
1082 (La. 1978); State v. Yates, 350 So. 2d 1169 (La. 1977); State v. Breston, 304 So.
2d 313 (La. 1974); State v. Brewer, 263 La. 113, 267 So. 2d 541 (1972); State v. Jones,
249 La. 324, 186 So. 2d 608 (1966); State v. Blackman, 39 La. Ann. 847, 2 So. 588 (1887).
10. See cases cited in note 9, supra.In State v. Rogers, 375 So. 2d 1304 (La. 1979),
however, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a defendant charged with conspiracy
was entitled to learn by a bill of particulars the names of any alleged coconspirators,
even though they might be witnesses for the state. The court reasoned that the principle that otherwise discoverable information need not be specified in a bill of particulars if the defendant is aware of the facts he requested did not support the contention that a defendant charged with conspiracy should know with whom he conspired.
Such an argument assumes the defendant's guilt and is not permissible in view of
the constitutional presumption of innocence. Id. at 1313. Rogers is distinguishable because
of a constitutional presumption of innocence, and it has been characterized as a "limited
exception" tothe general rule that criminal discovery does not enable a defendant
to discover the state's witnesses. See State v. Hennigan, 404 So. 2d 222, 227 (La. 1981).
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In analyzing the pertinent statutes, as previously mentioned, the
court noted that the Louisiana discovery articles do not prohibit a
court from ordering the prosecution to provide the defense counsel
with the names and addresses of actual and potential state witnesses."2
The court analyzed article 723 of the Code of Criminal Procedure'
and determined that "this codal disclaimer relative to statements of
state witnesses, and the absence of provisions relative to names and
addresses of state witnesses, does not statutorily prohibit the discovery
of a list of the state's witnesses."" The absence of a pertinent provision relative to the names of state witnesses was contrasted with
article 728, which "specifically provides that the chapter does not
authorize the discovery of the names, as well as the statements of
defense witnesses."" The court concluded that article 728 is an intentional legislative disclaimer to the discovery of the names of defense
witnesses which is not paralleled in the discovery of the names of
prosecution witnesses. 5 Therefore, the court held that since the
disclosure of the names and addresses of state witnesses is not
statutorily prohibited, the trial judge had discretion to grant the defendant's request for such a list,'" as sanctioned by article 3 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure."
The court noted that its construction of the Louisiana discovery

408 So. 2d at 1339 (citing LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 723 & 728).
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 723 provides:
Except as provided in Articles 716, 718, 721, and 722, this Chapter does not
authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda or other internal
state documents made by the district attorney or by agents of state in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case; or of statements made by
witnesses or prospective witnesses, other than the defendant, to the district attorney, or to agents of the state.
13. 408 So. 2d at 1338.
14. 408 So. 2d at 1340. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 728 provides:
Except as to scientific or medical reports, this Chapter does not authorize the
discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal defense documents
made by the defendant or his attorneys or agents in connection with the investigation or defense of the case; or of statements made by the defendant, or by witnesses
or prospective witnesses to the defendant, his agents or attorneys; or of the names
of defense witnesses or prospective defense witnesses.
15. 408 So. 2d at 1340.
16. Id.
17. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 3 provides: "Where no procedure is specifically
prescribed by this Code or by statute, the court may proceed in a manner consistent
with the spirit of the provisions of this Code and other applicable statutory and constitutional provisions." The court may have based the decision on its inherent authority
to establish procedural rules "not in conflict with law." LA. CONST. art. V, S 5(a) provides: "The supreme court has general supervisory jurisdiction over all other courts.
It may establish procedural and administrative rules not in conflict with law and may
assign a sitting or retired judge to any court."
11.

12.
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articles was essentially the same as that of the federal courts in dealing with similar articles of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the "source provisions for the Louisiana discovery articles.""8 A survey
of the federal jurisprudence reveals that in noncapital cases," the
government is not required to disclose the names of its witnesses.'
However, it is within the trial court's discretion to grant a defendant's request for a list of the witnesses whom the government intends to call at trial.21 Although the origin of this discretion is subject to some disagreement, 2 the premise upon which it generally is
based is that 18 U.S.C. S 3432, requiring that a defendant in a capital
case be furnished with a list of the witnesses the government intends
to call at trial, merely sets a minimum standard of disclosure in capital
cases, under the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.1 Therefore,
although the federal rules were intended to be a comprehensive pro18. 408 So. 2d at 1339. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2) provides: "Ithis rule does not
authorize the discovery ... of statements made by government witnesses or prospective government witnesses." Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2) with LA. CRIM. P. art.
723 (quoted in note 14, supra). FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b) provides: "If no procedure is
specifically prescribed by rule, the court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or with any applicable statute." Compare FED. R. CRIM. P.
57(b) with LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 3 (quoted in note 17, supra).
19. See 18 U.S.C. S 3432 (described in note 4, supra).
20. United States v. Trapnell, 638 F.2d 1016 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Dark,
597 F.2d 1097 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979); United States v. Pelton, 578
F.2d 701 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Dreitzler, 577 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 921 (1979); United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 444 (D. Del. 1980);
United States v. Bremer, 482 F. Supp. 821 (W.D. Okla. 1979); United States v. Brown,
477 F. Supp. 492 (D. Or. 1979); United States v. Munsey, 457 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Tenn.
1978); United States v. Hall, 424 F. Supp. 508 (W.D. Okla. 1975), affd, 536 F.2d 313
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919 (1976).
21. United States v. Kendricks, 623 F.2d 1165 (6th. Cir. 1980); United States v.
John Bernard Indus. Inc., 589 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Sclamo, 578
F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Krohn, 558 F.2d 390 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 868 (1977); United States v. Clardy, 540 F.2d 439 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 963 (1976); United States v. Cannone, 528 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1975); United States
v. Jackson, 508 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Holman, 490 F. Supp. 755
(E.D. Pa. 1980); United States v. Climatemp, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 376 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
22. See 8 J. MOORE, supra note 7, at 221. Moore believes the disclosure of
witnesses may be sanctioned by FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. He bases his conclusion upon
the Advisory Committee's Note to subdivision (D)(1), which states: "Although the rule
does not attempt to indicate when a protective order should be entered, it is obvious
that one would be appropriate where there is reason to believe that a witness would
be subject to physical or economic harm if his identity is revealed." If names of witnesses
were not to be disclosed, Moore reasons, the committee would not have cited this
as an appropriate occasion to issue a protective order. See United States v. Moceri,
359 F. Supp. 431, 434 (N.D. Ohio 1973) for the principle that FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b)
(quoted in note 18, supra) provides the authority for such an order because it allows
the courts to proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with the rules.
23. See United States v. Jackson, 508 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Richter, 488 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1973).
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cedural code, they do not set the outer limits of a trial court's power.
Furthermore, in Will v. United States," the United States Supreme
Court observed, "[Ilt is not uncommon for the Government to be required to disclose the names of some potential witnesses in a bill of
particulars, where this information is necessary or useful in the defendant's preparation for trial."25
In addition to its statutory construction of the Louisiana discovery
articles, the Louisiana Supreme Court indicated that the disclosure
ordered by the trial judge was constitutionally mandated, based on
the "concepts of fundamental fairness, due process and the constitutional right to counsel [which requires] that a defendant and his
attorney [must be allowed] the opportunity to prepare adequately for
trial."2 The trial judge, according to the court, granted the defendant's motion in order. to give the defendant and his attorney an
opportunity to prepare adequately for trial. In approving this action,
the supreme court stated that "there is authority in the trial judge
under the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions
to order pre-trial discovery where he considers that fundamental
fairness requires it." 7 The court believed that the defendant's contention that he could not prepare an adequate defense without the
requested disclosure was not an unplausible one.28
The limits of the trial court's discretion may differ depending upon
whether the controlling rationale is statutorily or constitutionally
based. The fact that defense counsel, through "normal investigative
means," could not locate witnesses to the incident is significant under
either rationale.
If the controlling rationale of this decision is statutorily based,
Louisiana courts could look to the standards of review developed by
the federal courts to define the limits of the trial court's discretion.
The Walters court emphasized the similarity between the federal
discovery articles and the Louisiana discovery articles. Several standards, such as a showing that disclosure is reasonable and necessary
in order to prepare for trial' or that the list of potential witnesses
is material in the preparation of the defense,"0 have been used by the
federal courts to determine whether a trial judge should invoke his
discretion and order the government to disclose its list of potential
witnesses. A majority of the courts require a specific showing of need
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

389 U.S. 90 (1967).
Id. at 99.
408 So. 2d at 1340.
Id. at 1338.
Id. at 1339.
United States v. Richter, 488 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1973).
United States v. Cafaro, 480 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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for disclosure that outweighs a specific government showing of need

for concealment. 3' A general need to prepare for cross-examination
is not sufficient, 2 especially where the government has made a showing that justice requires suppression of vitness identities until trial.3
The interests of both the state and the defendant could be adequately served by limiting the discretion of the trial judge to order
disclosure to those cases in which the defendant has made a
particularized showing of need that outweighs the state's need for
concealment. The defendant would have access to information for
which he had demonstrated a need, and the state, in addition to being
allowed the chance to prevent disclosure by showing a greater need
to conceal the identities of its witnesses, could request that the order
be conditioned so as to minimize any adverse effects." If this standard had been applied in Walters, the fact that the defense attorney,
through "normal investigative means," could not locate witnesses
would have been a major factor in the court's determination that the
defendant had made a particularized showing of need that outweighed
the state's need for concealment.
31. In United States v. Brown, 477 F. Supp. 492 (D. Or. 1979), disclosure was ordered
because of a possibility of precipitous withdrawal of defense counsel late in proceedings
as a result of potential conflicts. However, disclosure was conditioned upon counsel
not divulging names to their clients and only using the names to check client records
and determine whether any potential conflict of interest could be foreseen. In United
States v. Price, 448 F. Supp. 503 (D. Colo. 1978), defendant's mother tongue was Ute
and his command of the English language was very limited; therefore, he would be
able to provide information to counsel only in response to declarative or leading questions. For this and other reasons, the court ordered disclosure. In United States v.
Greater Syracuse Bd. of Realtors, 438 F. Supp. 376 (N.D.N.Y. 1977), disclosure was
ordered upon recognition that the case would be complex (violation of Sherman Antitrust Act) and involve a large number of- witnesses. Also, the probability of witness
harassment and attempts to suborn witness perjury would .be less than in the average
criminal case. In United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Cal. 1975), disclosure
was denied because the defendant was unable to substantiate her claim of a limited
ability to remember and relate critical events surrounding the alleged commission of
the crime. See also United States v. Cannone, 528 F.2d 296, 302 (2d Cir. 1975); United
States v. Goldman, 439 F. Supp. 337, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
32. United States v. Sclamo, 578 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Sherman, 426 F. Supp. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); United States v. Pastor, 419 F. Supp. 1318 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
33. In United States v. Clardy, 540 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1976), denial of defendant's
request was due to a clear possibility that disclosure of names and exact whereabouts
of inmates who planned to testify against the defendant in a prison homicide trial
might have endangered those witnesses. In United States v. Cafaro, 480 F. Supp. 511
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), the request for the names of all witnesses involved in a witness protection program would have defeated the purpose of the program.
34. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 729.1(B), which provides "[ulpon a sufficient showing by either party, the court may at any time vacate, restrict or defer an order for
discovery, or make such other order as is appropriate." See also Walters, 408 So. 2d
at 1340 n.4.
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However, if the controlling rationale of Walters is constitutionally based, the limits of the trial judge's discretion would seem to be
"to order pre-trial discovery where he considers that fundamental
fairness requires it."3 The discretionary function thus is defined in
terms of whether denial of discovery would be a violation of "fundamental fairness." Once such a determination is affirmatively made,
a trial court would be obligated to order discovery. Constitutionally
mandated discovery would restrict the judge's authority, "[u]pon a
sufficient showing by either party, . . . [to] vacate, restrict or defer
an order for discovery."3 If the discovery is mandated by fundamental fairness, the judge would be obligated to order it, despite a "sufficient showing" by the state that the witness would be in danger by
such an order.
Although the Walters opinion seems to indicate that the constitutional basis is but one of two separate and distinct rationales for the
decision, the later case of State v. Washington37 apparently embraced
the constitutional rationale as controlling in Walters. In Washington,
the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order granting the defendant's motion to discover the names, addresses, and
telephone numbers of the state's witnesses. Noting the trial judge's
reliance on Walters, the per curiam opinion stated that "there was
no determinations that there [existed] peculiar and distinctive reasons
why fundamental fairness [dictated] discovery. Nor [did] the record
reflect any such showing by the defendant."' Walters and Washington
clearly indicate that a trial judge will not have abused his discretion
in ordering the state to disclose a list of its witnesses when "fundamental fairness" dictates such discovery. The Walters court observed that
"[iut has long been a mainstay of . . . fundamental fairness . . . that
a defendant and his attorney have the opportunity to prepare adequately for trial." 9 The inaccessibility of witnesses "through normal
investigative means," Walters indicates, prevents a defendant and his
attorney from having an opportunity to prepare adequately for trial.
Pretrial interviews of witnesses are advantageous for several
reasons. In general, they allow the defense to prepare its case. A
pretrial interview may alleviate surprise if the witness's testimony
is unfavorable. 0 The most obvious advantage to interviewing a witness
is finding that he has exculpatory information.
35. 408 So. 2d at 1338.
36. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 729.1(B).
37. 411 So. 2d 451 (La. 1982).
38. Id. at 451.
39. 408 So. 2d at 1340.
40. Hagen, Interviewing Witnesses in Criminal Cases, 28 BROOKLYN L. REV. 207,
209 (1962).
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The United States Supreme Court, in Brady v. Maryland,"
established the rule that "the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."42 Under
Brady's progeny," exculpatory matter in the possession of the state
must be disclosed to the defense, when specifically requested, if it
might affect the outcome of the trial. If the defense makes no request or only a general request for such information, the exculpatory
matter nevertheless must be disclosed if it is material to the issue
of guilt or punishment." Although many courts adhere to the view
that Brady did not address pretrial discovery," other courts have
taken a more flexible approach. These latter courts reason that Brady
requires that the defendant be treated with fundamental fairness and
not hindered in the presentation of his defense. Therefore, in those
cases where disclosure is required, it must be made at a time when
it would be of use to the defendant, implying in some circumstances
a constitutional duty to disclose before trial.46
In State v. Migliore,7 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a
41. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
42. Id. at 87.
43. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Scurr v. Niccum, 620 F.2d 186
(8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Young, 618 F.2d 1281 (8th Cir. 1980); Garrison v. Maggio, 540 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 940 (1977).
44. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
45. United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1346 (7th Cir. 1979) ("The appropriate
standard . . .is whether disclosure came so late as to prevent the defendant from
receiving a fair trial."); United States v. Wolfson, 289 F. Supp. 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
United State6 v. Zirpolo, 288 F. Supp. 993 (D.N.J. 1968); United States v. Armantrout,
278 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v. Manhattan Brush Co., 38 F.R.D.
4 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
46. United States v. Polisi, 416 F.2d 573, 577 (2d Cir. 1969) ("The importance of
Brady, then, is its holding that the concept out of which the constitutional dimension
arises in these cases, is prejudice to the defendant measured by the effect of the suppression upon defendant's preparation for trial, rather than its effect upon the jury's
verdict."); Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1105
(1969); United States v. Cullen, 305 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Wis. 1969); United States v.
Curry, 278 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Ill. 1967); United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y.
1967). However, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), does not support such a
broad interpretation of Brady:
It has been argued that the standard should focus on the impact of the undisclosed evidence on the defendant's ability to prepare for trial, rather than the
materiality of the evidence to the issue of guilt or innocence .. . . Such a standard would be unacceptable for determining the materiality of what has been
generally recognized as "Brady material" .... [Tihat standard would necessarily
encompass incriminating evidence as well as exculpatory evidence, since knowledge
of the prosecutor's entire case would always be useful in planning the defense.
Id. at 112 n.20.
47. 261 La. 722, 260 So. 2d 682 (1972).
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defendant had a right to pretrial inspection of a substance, if there
was a sufficient amount, in cases where his guilt or innocence turned
upon an analysis of that substance. The court, however, refused to
hold that denial of the right to conduct an independent analysis would
deprive the defendant of due process of law.4" Thereafter, in State
49
v. Barnard,
the court denied the defendant's motion to allow his own
expert to inspect a murder weapon and bullet, reasoning that there
was no showing under Brady that an independent inspection would
have been favorable to the defendant. The Fifth Circuit effectively
reversed this ruling, using a rationale, predicated on Brady, that suggests that a defendant must be afforded the opportunity to develop
favorable evidence." This rationale is consistent with State v.
Woodruff,51 in which the Louisiana Supreme Court held that it was
error to deny the pretrial discovery of information about a weapon
found near the victim when the defendant asserted a claim of selfdefense, as this information might have facilitated proof of the defendant's claim.2 An expansion of this doctrine to include discovery of
information- to facilitate general preparation of a defense seemed to
have been precluded by the court's subsequent decision in State v.
Collins,' a unanimous decision that specifically limited Woodruff to
self-defense claims. However, Walters broadens the scope of Woodruff
and Migliore to allow pretrial discovery of the names and addresses
of state witnesses when the identification of these witnesses would
not be available to the defense through "normal investigative means."
This disclosure is not mandated by the defendant's need to "meet the
state's evidence," a contention that has been rejected numerous times.'
Rather, Walters recognizes a right to the opportunity to develop
favorable evidence from these witnesses (since no others were
available to the defense) and thereby preserve the constitutional right
to prepare adequately for trial.55
Although great emphasis was placed upon the phrase "normal investigative means," the Walters court did not define it. The most com48. 261 La. at 743, 260 So. 2d at 689. See Joseph, Work of the LouisianaAppellate
Courts, 1971-1972 Term-Criminal Procedure I, 33 LA. L. REV. 298 (1973).
49. 287 So. 2d 770 (La. 1973).
50. Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975). See Lamonica, Work of
the LouisianaAppellate Courts, 1974-1975 Term-Pre-TrialCriminal Procedure, 36 LA.

L.

REV.

593 (1976).

51. 281 So. 2d 95 (La. 1973).
52. Id. at 98. See also Lamonica, supra note 50, at 596-97.
53. 308 So. 2d 263 (La. 1975).
54. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1971); State v. Johnson, 333 So. 2d 223 (La.
1976); State v. Peters, 302 So. 2d 888 (La. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 878 (1975).
55. The court stated, "To so allow [that a defendant and his attorney have the
opportunity to prepare adequately for trial] under the special facts of this case, the
trial judge in his discretion granted defendant's motion.
... 408 So. 2d at 1340.
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mon method to locate a witness is to canvass the scene of the crime. 6
Much importance is placed upon the habitual nature of man, and
therefore it is suggested that one should comb the area at the same
time of day and the same day of the week that the crime occurred.5"
This method would be ineffective in Walters, however, because a Mardi
Gras parade crowd is not an habitual one. It is a mass of people that
gathers once a year, and as the court stated, many of the people are
not residents of New Orleans or Louisiana. 8 A second method commonly used to locate witnesses is publication through newspapers or
radio, asking potential witnesses to contact the attorney.59 The effectiveness of this method also is diminished in the Walters situation,
since the large number of nonresidents involved greatly reduces the
likelihood of finding potential witnesses. Newspaper reporters and
photographers sent to the scene of the crime also are regarded as
reliable sources of information. Reporters usually interview persons
at the scene of the crime, and they often can supply the names of
witnesses. The identity of a bystander in a photograph may be ascertained if he is wearing a uniform or has some identifiable ensignia
on his clothing." Other methods, such as "informal" chats with the
prosecutor, the prosecutorial staff, or policemen investigating the
case,"' depend heavily upon personal relationships in order to be
effective. If these methods are considered "normal investigative
means," the use of such means to search for witnesses in the Walters
situation clearly would yield unproductive results. It is suggested.
however, that there must be an objective determination of the inability to locate witnesses through "normal investigative means." The
fact that a particular attorney is unable to locate witnesses should
not be determinative. The test should focus upon whether the
witnesses can be located through the methods discussed.
The decision in Walters, as apparently limited by Washington,
stands for the proposition that when defense counsel has no opportunity to prepare adequately for trial through normal investigative
means, disclosure of the identity of the state's witnesses is constitutionally mandated. A defendant has been deprived of the opportunity to
prepare adequately for trial if he has no opportunity to develop
favorable evidence. Precluding the defendant from developing
favorable evidence from witnesses to the incident unavailable to him
through "normal investigative means" is a violation of fundamental
56.
57.
58.
59.

1 AM. JUR. TR. 2d Investigating the Civil Case S 74 (1964).
Id.
408 So. 2d at 1338.
F. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATT, INVESTIGATION AND PREPARATION OF CRIMINAL
CASES-FEDERAL AND STATE 29-30 (1970).
60. Id. See also 2 AM. JUR. TR. 2d Locating and Interviewing Witnesses S 17 (1964).
61. F. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATT, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL ADVOCACY 53 (1974).
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fairness. The Louisiana discovery articles contemplate this fundamental
fairness by allowing discovery of tangible objects that the state intends to use as evidence at trial." Walters provides a remedy with
regard to the discovery of witnesses when denial would be a violation of fundamental fairness. The burden on the defendant who seeks
relief apparently will be much greater in the state courts than in the
federal courts, where the standard is a particularized need for
disclosure that outweighs the government's need for concealment."
Although the federal standard might make discovery more readily
available than the Louisiana standard, requiring a violation of fundamental fairness, the supreme court may have been hesitant to grant
such an expansive remedy in view of legislative inaction on the subject.

Sandra L. Edwards
62.
63.

LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 718.

See text at note 31, supra.

